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Abstract
We study the consumption and hedging strategy of an oil-importing developing country that faces
multiple crude oil shocks. In our model, developing countries have two particular characteristics: their
economies are mainly driven by natural resources and their technologies are less ecient in energy usage.
The natural resource exports can be correlated with the crude oil shocks. The country can hedge against
the crude oil uncertainty by taking long/short positions in existing crude oil futures contracts. We nd
that both, ineciencies in energy usage and shocks to the crude oil price, lower the productivity of
capital. This generates a negative income eect and a positive substitution eect, because today's
consumption is relatively cheaper than tomorrow's consumption. Optimal consumption of the country
depends on the magnitudes of these eects and on its risk-aversion degree. Shocks to other crude oil
factors, such as the convenience yield, are also studied. We nd that the persistence of the shocks
magnies the income and substitution eects on consumption, thus aecting also the hedging strategy
of the country. The demand for futures contracts is decomposed in a myopic demand, a pure hedging
term and productive hedging demands. These hedging demands arise to hedge against changes in the
productivity of capital due to changes in crude oil spot prices. We calibrate the model for Chile and
study up to what extent the country's copper exports can be used to hedge the crude oil risk.
Keywords: Crude oil prices, convenience yields, risk management, emerging markets, government
policy, two-sector economies.
JEL Classication: G11, Q43, Q48, D92, O41, C601 Introduction
The recent steeply rise in crude oil prices is comparable to the hike observed in prices in the
70's and early 80's. The fact that nine out of the previous ten US recessions were preceded by an
increase in oil prices has brought back the interest of researchers and policymakers in understanding
the eect of energy shocks in the economy.1 But the impact of oil-price shocks in developing
economies is dierent than the one in more developed countries. In general, developing countries
have higher energy-intensive manufacturing as a fraction of their GDP and use energy less eciently
(see International Energy Agency 2004). Also, many of these economies are less diversied than
developed economies and rely on the export of a few primary commodities that ow from their
natural resources.2 These exports are sometimes called the natural exports. Interestingly, changes
in the natural exports due to variations in the domestic commodity prices are sometimes correlated
with crude oil shocks.3 This correlation added to the higher energy usage make these economies
dierent from more developed country. Surprisingly, there has not been enough attention to the
risk-management policy that the countries can implement to confront these uctuations. Nowadays
crude oil futures are the most actively traded contracts and can signicantly reduce the exposure
of an economy to crude oil risk.
In this paper we study the consumption and hedging strategies of an oil-importing developing
country that faces exogenous multiple crude oil shocks. To capture the relation between oil and
the developing economy, we consider that the country has two productive sectors: a capital sector
and the exports. The country combines oil and capital to produce more capital. There are some
particular parameters in this technology that regulate the eciency of oil usage. The second
technology sector produces the natural exports of the country that can be correlated with the oil
price shocks. Other types of exports are included in the capital's production technology. Under
this setting, a less developed country has more natural exports relative to its capital than more
developed economies. The country chooses how much capital to consume, how much oil to import
at the prevailing market prices and also chooses the hedging strategy with nancial instruments.
Recent nancial studies have developed multi-factor Gaussian models that correctly captures the
dynamics of crude oil prices (see for example Schwartz 1997, and Casassus and Collin-Dufresne 2005).
We consider a generalization of these models. A multi-factor model is important because the risk
management techniques involve trading in oil futures contracts that can be subject to numerous
sources of uncertainty.4 The optimal hedging strategy imply long/short positions in the existing
crude oil futures contracts. There are at least as many futures contracts available as crude oil risk
1See the reviews of Jones, Leiby, and Paik (2004) and Kilian (2007) for the current state of this literature.
2For example, using the data from Table 1 of Cashin, Cespedes, and Sahay (2004) we nd that between 1991 and
1999, copper accounted for 85% of the exports of Zambia and 41% of the exports of Chile. In the same period, gold
corresponded to 34%, 18% and 17% of Burundi, South Africa and Ghana exports, respectively.
3Using monthly average prices from Sep-1995 to Aug-2007 we nd a correlation between oil and copper returns
of 28.9% and between oil and gold returns of 16.4%.
4For example, futures prices in a 3-factor model depend on three sources of uncertainty that can be interpreted
as the level, slope and curvature of the futures curve.
1factors, so that the developing country can fully hedge the oil risk if it's optimal to do so. These
nancial instruments also enhances the investment opportunity set of the country. We assume that
the country only chooses to hedge against the crude oil risk factors. The country decides not to
hedge its own exports because there are no nancial contracts available, or simply because it has
a comparative advantage over other commodity producers.5
It is important to have close-form expressions to understand the economics behind the country's
consumption and futures contract holdings. We use an asymptotic expansion technique to nd
approximate analytical expressions for the country's decisions. This technique expands the solution
of our problem around the closed-form solution of a particular case (see Kogan and Uppal 2003).
Indeed, as the input share of oil in the economy and the natural exports of the country goes to
zero, the solution converges to the portfolio selection model of Merton (1969, 1971).
We nd that the country's consumption increases with its natural exports, because they increase
the country's wealth. The relative risk-aversion degree plays a crucial role in the country's decisions
through the well-known income and substitutions eects with respect to the dierent variables
of the model (see Kim and Omberg 1996, Campbell and Viceira 2002). In terms of oil usage,
less ecient countries consume a lower fraction of their wealth if they are mainly worried about
consumption smoothing (i.e. they have a risk-aversion degree greater than 1). Countries with lower
risk-aversion degrees consume a higher fraction of their wealth than developed countries because
of the substitution eect. Indeed, in this case the consumption good is more scarce in the future,
implying that today's consumption good is relatively cheaper than tomorrow's consumption. The
crude oil price has a negative eect for oil-importing economies, because it implies a decrease in
the productivity of capital. Oil shocks aect the current state of the economy, but also the state in
the future, specially if they are persistent. Highly risk-averse countries decrease their consumption
if a price shock occurs, because of a negative income eect. Interestingly, countries with lower
risk-aversion degree may increase today's consumption due to a positive substitution eect of crude
oil prices. Shocks to other variables related to the crude oil dynamics, such as the convenience
yield, alter consumption through their eect on the expected change in the crude oil price. A
positive shock to the convenience yield has a positive eect for oil-importing economies because
it decreases the expected oil price. The convenience yield creates a positive income eect and a
negative substitution eect.
The country's hedging strategy is determined by the eect of the dierent variables in con-
sumption. The strategy can be decomposed in three components. First, we obtain the standard
myopic demand related to the risk-return trade-o of the nancial instruments. Second, we nd
that the country takes positions in contracts for pure hedging purposes in order to minimize the
variance of the country's wealth. The natural exports and their correlation with the oil shocks
have a crucial role in determining the size of this component. A higher correlation implies short
5Studying the hedging policies of some emerging countries in our sample shows that our assumption is quiet
reasonable. For example Codelco, Chile's public copper mining company, that owns one of the largest copper mines
in the world, has only 9% of its future production hedged for the period between 2006 and 2012.
2positions in the futures that can potentially oset long positions due to other demands. Finally, the
country has hedging demands with respect to each one of the crude oil risk factors. These demands
arise because the oil factors aect the future productivity of the country. The persistence of the
crude oil shocks have a signicant impact in the magnitud of the positions in the futures contracts.
We consider Chile as the benchmark developing economy and study its decisions in the case that
the crude oil price is driven by a one-factor model. We nd that a positive correlation between the
Chilean natural exports and the crude oil price reduces considerably the positions in the crude oil
futures contracts. The natural exports can potentially work as a natural hedge against crude oil
risk. If we concentrate only on the hedging characteristics of the futures contacts and assume a
high risk aversion degree for Chile, we obtain that the country hedges between -30% and 10% of
the annual crude oil imports depending on the natural exports and their correlation with the crude
oil shocks.
An extensive literature studies the link between oil prices and economic activity. Darby (1982),
Hamilton (1983, 1988) and Mork (1989) report evidence supporting the hypothesis that oil prices
have a signicant eect on output. More recently, Hamilton (2003) propose a non-linear speci-
cations for an oil shock considering the smaller eect of price shocks on real economic activity
detected since the mid-1980s. The mechanism by which oil aects the economy remains unclear,
specially because on average oil accounts only for a small part of the total marginal cost of pro-
duction. Kim and Loungani (1992) explicitly include energy as an input in a real business cycle
(RBC) model and nd that oil price shocks should account only for a minor part of the output
volatility. Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) consider the eects of imperfect competition and nd
that a model involving implicit collusion in the product market can signicantly increase the eect
of an energy price shocks on output. Finn (2000) proposes an explanation based on the relation
between the capital utilization rate and energy prices.
Several papers study the connection between the economic performance of developing coun-
tries and the price of the commodities that these countries export (Deaton and Miller (1995),
Deaton (1999), among others). Only few papers deal with the management of oil price risk in
developing countries. Daniel (2001) and Devlin and Titman (2004) study the eectiveness of oil
stabilization funds compared to managing risk with nancial instruments when the country is a net
exporter of oil. Both papers nd that in theory the usage of derivatives dominates the stabilization
fund approach, but in practice governments have favored the latter alternative. The authorities
fear the political cost of ending up worse o and also lack of know how to implement these nancial
strategies. Devlin and Titman (2004) also argues that stabilization funds solution is even less e-
cient if oil price shocks are persistent. Claessens and Varangis (1991) studies a historical simulation
of dierent hedging strategies of a state oil-importing company for the period 1986-1990. They
show that the the company would have beneted substantially with the usage of futures contracts
even if it were subject to basis risk.
Our paper relates to a large literature about hedging using commodity derivatives. The classical
papers in this area focus on the hedging strategy of a producer that faces output price uncertainty
3in a static framework (see Rolfo 1980, Anderson and Danthine 1980, Feder, Just, and Schmitz 1980,
Newbery and Stiglitz 1981). Ho (1984) extends this problem to a dynamic setting. Other papers
solve the hedging strategy from an investors point of view using futures contracts (see Adler and
Detemple 1988a, Adler and Detemple 1988b, Due and Jackson 1990, Briys and de Varenne 1998,
Lioui and Poncet 1996, Lioui and Poncet 2005). A couple of recent papers consider a stochastic
convenience yield in an explicit way. Hong (2001) explains how the persistence of the convenience
yield shocks aects the distribution of the open interest among contracts of dierent maturities.
Mellios and Six (2008) studies the hedging problem when the commodity follows a multi-factor
Gaussian process with a stochastic convenience yield. This paper and ours use the same machinery,
however, the focus of the studies are dierent. Mellios and Six (2008) solves the general hedging
problem and considers stochastic interest rates and time-varying risk premia which may play an
important role for some commodities (i.e. for silver and gold). We are concentrated on the eect
of the production side and the natural exports on the hedging strategy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the models for the developing country and
for the crude oil price. Section 3 provides an analytical solution for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation and discusses the resulting hedging and consumption strategies. Section 4 presents the
empirical estimation and analyzes the economic implications for a one-factor crude oil pricing model.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Production Technologies in the Developing Country
We assume that the oil-importing emerging economy has two productive sectors: a capital sector
and a natural resource sector that exports the production of the domestic commodity (i.e. the
natural exports).
The capital sector K(t) has a Cobb-Douglas production technology that uses capital and crude
oil as inputs. We consider the following dynamics for the developing country's capital stock:
dK(t) =
 
K(t)1 (! Q(t))   S(t)Q(t) + X(t)   C(t)

dt; (1)
where K(t) is the stock of capital,  is the total factor productivity,  denotes the oil share of
input in the production of capital, Q(t) is the demand for crude oil, S(t) is the price of a barrel
of crude oil, X(t) are the natural exports and C(t) is consumption. The parameter ! regulates
the eciency of oil usage. It is higher for countries with more ecient technologies, because oil is
a more productive input. The country chooses how many barrels of oil to import and how much
capital to consume at any given time t. The demand for oil is relatively small compared to the
global aggregate demand, thus the country is assumed to be a crude oil price taker.
4Rather than assuming a process for the natural resource stock, we directly model the exports
from this sector. Other types of exports from alternative sources are included in the capital's
production technology. We consider the natural exports, X(t), to follow a geometric Brownian
motion:
dX(t) =  X(t)dt + XX(t)db Z(t); (2)
where  and X are the `depreciation rate' and the volatility of the export changes, respectively.
The natural exports decreases over time because the natural resource is assumed to be exhaustible.
Another interpretation for a decrease in the natural exports is that the economy develops over time,
meaning that more developed countries have lower natural exports to capital ratios. Finally, b Z(t)
is a standard Brownian motion, that can be correlated with the crude oil shocks described in the
next section.
There is an innitely-lived emerging country that maximizes the expected utility of consumption
given by
U(t;C) = e  tC1 
1   
for  > 0; 6= 1 (3)
The eect of crude oil in the developing country is twofold. First, it has a direct impact in
the economy's marginal productivity of capital, since the crude oil is as input to the economy.
The higher the price of the oil, the lower the country's output. The second eect, is through a
possible correlation between the crude oil shocks and the natural exports of the country. If these
are positively correlated, then an increase in the oil price can generate an increase in the exports.
In this case, the two oil eects have opposite directions, implying that the exports can potentially
act as a natural hedge against crude oil shocks. In a dynamic economy like ours, crude oil shocks
can also have a substantial eect in the economy's productivity in subsequent periods.
2.2 General Gaussian Crude Oil Price Process
For the crude oil price process we extend the approach of Casassus and Collin-Dufresne (2005)
(CCD) to multiple sources of uncertainty. We introduce a canonical representation of an n-factor
Gaussian model for crude oil (log) prices similar to the standard ane models from the term
structure literature.6 The model is in the A0(n) family using the terminology of Dai and Single-
ton (2000).
We assume that the spot crude oil (log) price, u(t) = logS(t), follows the standard no-arbitrage
dynamics under the equivalent martingale measure Q:
du(t) =
















6See Due and Kan (1996), Due, Pan, and Singleton (2000) and Dai and Singleton (2000).













are n independent standard Brownian motions. The
n  1 vector &, denes the instantaneous correlation structure of the (log) price with other factors
aecting the oil price dynamics.
The proposed Gaussian model considers time-varying expected crude oil returns. Its exibility
to t the data is given by a stochastic specication for the convenience yield (t).7 Empirical
studies (Schwartz (1997), CCD among others) suggest that the variability of crude oil returns are
mostly explained by changes in the convenience yield, rather than by changes in interest rates. For
this reason and to keep the model simple, we assume a constant interest rate. We generalize the
model in CCD and assume that the convenience yield is a linear function of the (log) price and
n   1 other factors represented by v(t)> = fv1(t);v2(t);:::;vn 1(t)g:
(t) =  0 +  uu(t) +  >
v v(t) (5)
The vector v(t) follows a Gaussian diusion process under the equivalent martingale measure Q:
dv(t) =  vv(t)dt + dZ
Q
v (t); (6)
where v is an n  n upper triangular matrix.8
The parameter  u in equation (5) plays a crucial role in the dynamics of the oil price. This
relation between convenience yields and oil prices allows the model to generate both, contango and
backwardation in the futures curve. Indeed, if  u is positive, the expected change in oil prices
(under the Q measure) is lower for high prices because the convenience yield is high, implying
higher degrees of backwardation. The opposite eect occurs for low oil prices.
We have chosen a slightly dierent canonical representation than in CCD where the (log) spot
price, u(t), is a function of the latent factors. We want to explicitly have the oil price as a factor in
the crude oil dynamics in order to understand the direct eect of this variable in the consumption
and hedging strategies. Under the CCD representation, the hedging strategy would be in terms of
n latent factors, rather than in terms of the spot price u(t) and n   1 latent factors.
To simplify the notation we dene Y (t) as the stacked vector of the n crude oil factors, Y (t)> =
fu(t);v1(t);:::;vn 1(t)g. Using equations (4)-(6) we obtain the dynamics of Y (t):
dY (t) = (0   Y Y (t))dt + Y dZ
Q
Y (t); (7)
7The convenience yield is dened as the implied benet associated with holding the underlying physical good, in
this case, a barrel of oil.
8 From an empirical point of view, it is worth noting the parameters r and  0 cannot be separately identied. If
we replace equation (5) in (4) we can see that the constant in the expected oil return is r    0. As we will see later,
we estimate the model only with futures prices data, and since the convenience yield is an unobservable variable, it
is impossible to identify  0 from the estimate of r    0. To circumvent this empirical issue we assume a value for
r and estimate  0 from the data. We prefer this overidentied representation to isolate the convenience yield eect













. The n1 vector 0, and the nn matrices Y and
Y , collect the parameters from the dynamics of the crude oil factors u(t) and v(t).
We assume the existence of crude oil futures contract in the nancial market. It is well known














are the solution to the following system













with boundary conditions B0;i(t+i) = 0, Bu;i(t+i) = 1 and Bv1;i(t+i) = ::: = Bvn 1;i(t+i) = 0.
These conditions ensure that at maturity Fi(t + i) = S(t + i).
To complete the model we assume a constant risk-premia specication:
dZ
Q
Y (t) = dZY (t) + Y dt (11)







is the risk-premia vector.
Under the physical measure P, the processes for the futures prices maturing i periods from
now are given by9
dFi(t) = Fi(t)BY;i(t)>Y Y dt + Fi(t)BY;i(t)>Y dZY (t): (12)
The processes under P are relevant for risk management decisions (rather than those under the
risk-neutral measure Q), because the implementation of these strategies implies holding futures
contracts over time. The country takes positions in futures contracts and demands a compensation
(here BY;i(t)>Y Y ) for bearing the risk embedded in those contracts.
Finally, we dene the process dF(t) as the vector of stacked processes dFi(t):
dF(t) = IF(t)F(t)Y dt + IF(t)F(t)dZY (t) (13)
where IF(t) is a matrix with the futures prices Fi(t) in the diagonal, and F(t) stacks the n row
vectors BY;i(t)>Y .
9Note that in the Gaussian model with constant risk premia, the futures returns dFi(t)=Fi(t) are not aected by
the level of Y (t). These state variables enter only through the futures price Fi(t).
73 Optimal Controls in the Developing Country
In this section we study the problem that faces the developing economy. At any given time, the
country chooses: (i) how much crude oil to demand for its production technology, (ii) how much
capital to consume, and (iii) the positions in the futures contracts in the economy.
The primary purpose of the futures contacts is hedging, however, they also enhance the invest-
ment opportunity set of the developing country because of their risk-return trade-o (i.e. Sharpe
ratios). This creates additional incentives to take positions in the nancial instruments. At any
time t we allow the country to take long/short positions in n available crude oil futures contracts
with maturities i = 1;:::;n. A multi-factor specication for the crude oil dynamics implies that
the economy wants to hedge not only against the crude oil price shocks, but also against changes in
the convenience yield factors. The country continuously rebalances its position in a dierent set of
contracts every time such that the maturities of the contracts remain constants. This assumption
avoids the expiration of the futures that would otherwise face the innitely-lived country. Trading
in n contracts is enough to span the whole futures curve when an n-factor model for crude oil prices
is considered. This also means that the country can fully hedge against the crude oil risks including
the risk of rolling over the futures contracts.10
Let us dene the n  1 vector p(t) as the number of crude oil futures contracts held by the
developing country at time t for each one of the n available contracts. A positive (negative) element
i of p(t) means that the country takes a long (short) position in the futures contract maturing in i
periods from time t. We restrict p(t) to be in the set of admissible strategies that lead to a strictly
positive capital process (K(t) > 0 a:s:). We only consider non-negative consumption and crude oil
demand strategies.
The optimal consumption-demand-hedging strategy of the developing country is the solution to
the following problem:11











K(t)1 (! Q(t))   S(t)Q(t) + X(t)   C(t)

dt + p(t)>dF(t) (15)
dX(t) =  X(t)dt + XX(t)(>
Y dZY (t) +
q
1   >
Y Y dZX(t)) (16)
dY (t) = (Y Y + 0   Y Y (t))dt + Y dZY (t) (17)
where J(K(t);X(t);Y (t);t) is the value function associated to the country's problem, 	 is
10Neuberger (1996) presents an alternative way of solving the rolling over problem.
11For the moment we assume that the optimal controls exist and are admissible. In the next section, we obtain an
approximated solution for the value function and determine the restrictions in the parameter space in order to have
admissible controls.
8the admissible set of strategies and dF(t) are the changes in the futures prices as dened in
equation (13). The futures contracts are marked to market, which implies an instantaneous ow
p(t)>dF(t) to the capital stock. Also, the country's natural exports can be correlated with both,
the oil price and convenience yield shocks. To see this we rewrite the Brownian motion of the
natural exports, b Z(t), as a linear combination of independent Brownian motions (compare equa-






as a Brownian motion that captures the unhedge-






as the correlation vector. Here, u stands for the correlation between
the exports and the crude oil shocks, and v denes the correlation between the exports and each
one of the latent factors. In the rest of the paper we drop the time argument from the variables to
simplify the notation.
Let us dene the `current' value function J(K;X;Y ) of the country's problem, such that
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where Ji is the partial derivative of J with respect to the state variable i and Jij are the second
order derivatives.
The next proposition presents the optimal decisions for the country's problem in equations (14)
to (17).
PROPOSITION 1: The optimal consumption for the developing country is C = J 1=
K and the




























Proof See Appendix A.1. 
Proposition 1 shows that Q is the maximizer of the expected change in the capital stock.
Indeed, let us dene  as:
 =
K1 (! Q)   S Q + X
K
: (21)
9This variable is the expected change in the capital stock before consumption and measures the
productivity per unit of capital in equation (1). The optimal demand for crude oil, Q, maximizes
. This simple result occurs because the capital technology is fully exibly, i.e., there are no
adjustment costs.
Equation (19) shows that Q is increasing in !, because oil is more productive for countries
with higher !. The optimal crude oil demand is decreasing in the price of the crude oil S. It
turns out that Q equates the marginal benet and the marginal cost of an extra barrel of oil,
thus it is independent from the exports and other variables in the economy. If we replace Q in
equation (21) we obtain the optimal productivity of capital . It is straightforward to show that
the productivity of capital is decreasing in the price of the crude oil S, i.e.
@
@S < 0. This last point
is central in what follows, because a higher crude oil price in the future will undoubtedly imply a
decrease in the future productivity of capital.
Proposition 1 also shows that what matters for the hedging strategy is the product of quantities
and prices (i.e. (p)>IF) which is in units of the numeraire good. Also, we nd that the holdings




>. If the futures returns volatilities are low, the country
will take a larger position in the futures contracts to have the same hedging eect. This is the only
place where the futures returns volatilities matter.12
The optimal holdings p in (20) result from the summation of three components. The rst term
is the standard myopic demand present in the classical Merton model and captures the risk-return
trade-o of the positions in futures contracts. It is proportional to the Sharpe ratio of each risk
factor,  1
Y Y . Its main purpose is to take advantage of the enhanced investment opportunity set
rather than hedging against changes in oil prices. If there are no risk premia embedded in the
futures contracts (i.e. Y = 0), there are no incentives for bearing crude oil risk and the myopic
demand fade away. This demand is also present in standard static models of portfolio selection.
The second component in equation (20) is a pure hedging term that is also myopic in the sense
that it appears even in a static version of the model. The risk-averse country is worried about
the variance of the natural exports, because it aects the volatility of consumption. This type
of hedging is sometimes called statistical hedging, because the coecients X  1
Y Y are the 's
of n regressions where each crude oil factor is regressed on the natural exports. The correlations
between the exports and the crude oil shocks, Y , play an important role, because they aect the
hedging capacity of the futures contracts against shocks in the natural export. If >
Y Y = 1, then
the natural exports can be fully hedged with the futures contracts. If the country has no natural
exports, this type of demand disappears. To see this, note that without exports the value function
J(t) is independent of X(t) implying that JKX = 0. The exports are a natural hedge against crude
oil shocks as long as this term decreases the absolute holdings of futures contracts.
12From equation (12) we nd that the maturities of the futures contracts enter only through the volatility of the




> in the hedging strategy.
10The last term includes the productive hedging demands due to changes in each crude oil factor
in Y (t). The interpretation of this term is similar to the hedging demands in Merton (1973) and
Breeden (1979), with the exception that here they hedge against future changes in the productivity
of capital rather than against changes in the investment opportunity set.13 These demands arise
because the country worries about changes in the crude oil price since it aects the productivity
of capital. For this reason we label these terms as productive hedging demands. Recall that the
crude oil factors Y (t) can be decomposed in the (log) spot price, u(t), and other latent factors,
v(t), associated to the convenience yield. A shock to the spot price can have a disparate eect in
the economy depending on whether it is a permanent or a temporal shock. The country is more
concerned about crude oil shocks if they persist in the economy for a longer period of time. If this
is the case, the productive hedging demand with respect to u(t) is more signicant. The latent
factors v(t) inuence crude oil prices in the future through the convenience yield, thus aecting
the future productivity of capital. In the case that oil is useless for the economy (i.e.  = 0 in
equation (1)), the crude oil shocks have no eect in future production, thus these hedging demands
disappear.
To the best of our knowledge, the problem that the developing country faces has no closed-form
solution. In the next section, we present an approximated solution that is asymptotically exact.
This will help us to get a better economic intuition about the decisions that the country takes.
3.1 An Approximated Solution
In this section we present the steps to obtain closed-form approximations for the consumption and
hedging strategies of the developing country in Proposition 1. First, we use the homogeneity of the
problem to reduce the number of state variables and then, we apply an asymptotic expansion tech-
nique to get an approximated solution around the standard Merton problem. The approximations
deliver various economic insights that are helpful to understand the decisions of the country.
We note that consumption is homogeneous of degree one in K(t) and X(t) and that the CRRA
utility function is homogeneous of degree (1 ). These two properties imply that the value function
J(t) is also homogeneous of degree (1  ). We can use this feature to reduce the state space from
n+2 to n+1 variables. The homogeneity feature implies that a country that doubles another one
in natural exports and capital stock will consume twice the consumption, demand twice the number
of crude oil barrels, and take twice the positions in futures contracts than the smaller country. For
this reason we discuss the results in terms of the consumption-wealth ratio and the market value of
the hedging positions to capital ratio. These variables are homogeneous of degree zero in K(t) and
X(t), meaning that the normalized natural exports to capital ratio, z(t), and the crude oil factors,




the initial natural exports to capital ratio, i.e., x0  K(0) 1X(0).14
13The investment opportunities in our model are given by the positions in the futures contracts, but the futures
return are independent of the state variables Y (t).
14The denition of x0 implies directly that z(0) = 1.
11We write the current value function as



















Replacing equation (22) and the optimal controls fC;Q;pg from Proposition 1 in equa-
tion (18), yields a non-linear second-order PDE for h(z;Y ) that we write as15
0 = G(z;Y ) (24)
It is hard to solve this equation numerically because it's a second-order equation in n + 1 state
variables. However, it is possible to obtain an approximation by doing an asymptotic expansion of
the solution. This approximation method has become popular in nance lately (see for example,
Kogan 2001, Kogan and Uppal 2003 and Janecek and Shreve 2004). This technique is exact in the
limit and its main advantage is that it provides informative explicit expressions for the optimal
consumption and hedging strategies.
The idea behind the asymptotic expansion technique is to do a Taylor expansion of the solution
of equation (24) around a particular set of parameters under which this PDE has an exact solution.
We note that the problem simplies considerably if the oil is useless in the economy (i.e.  = 0)
and the country has no natural exports (i.e. x0 = 0).16 In this case, the solution converges to the
well-known closed-form solution of the innite-horizon model of Merton (1969). Indeed, under this
scenario the production technology K(t) has constant returns to scale, because: (i) Q(t) and X(t)
are zero, and (ii) the investment opportunity set given by the futures returns is independent of the
state variables. The value function is independent of X(t) and Y (t) and the problem reduces to
the Merton solution. In this case h(z;Y ) = 0 which implies that the country consumes a constant
fraction A1 of its capital and the positions in the futures contracts are proportional to  1 1
Y Y .
The approximated solution is valid as long  and x0 stay relatively close to zero. As we will see
later, even for small values of  and x0, there is a lot of action in our model and the consumption and
hedging strategies dier signicantly from the Merton solutions. Moreover, these assumptions have
reasonable economic foundations. We expect the ratio between the natural exports and capital to
be a small gure even for less developed countries. For example, for Chile whose economy depends
heavily on its copper exports, we estimate that the copper exports to capital ratio is less than 1%.
15Equation (A1) in Appendix A.2 shows the resulting dierential equation. Here, we prefer to omit the details,
because the equation is messy and uninformative.
16We could have expressed equation (22) in terms of the natural exports to capital ratio instead of z(t), but using
z(t) as a state variable claries the idea that we are expanding with respect to the initial natural exports to capital
ratio, x0.
12The same happens with . Recent RBC studies that include energy as a production factor use
values around 4% for the oil share of income,  (see Finn (2000) and Wei (2003)).
We show the approximation technique for a rst-order expansion, but this methodology can be
implemented for higher-order expansions. We assume the following structure for the solution of
equation (24)
h(z;Y ) = h()(z;Y ) + h()(z;Y ) + h(x0)(z;Y )x0 + O(2nd-order terms) (25)
where  =

1  log().17 We replace this solution in the PDE and pursue a rst-order Taylor
expansion of G(z;Y ) around  = 0,  = 0 and x0 = 0 to get
G(z;Y ;) = G(z;Y ;0) + >rG(z;Y ;0) + O(2nd-order terms) (26)
where > = (;;x0) and rG() is the gradient vector with the parcial derivatives of G() with
respect to . We seek for the functions h()(z;Y ), h()(z;Y ) and h(x0)(z;Y ) such that the approx-
imated PDE is satised to a rst-order degree. The h(j)() functions need to be independent of 
and x0. Interestingly, we nd that these are ane functions in the state variables z(t) and Y (t).
The next proposition shows the results after the rst-order expansion has been performed.18
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that
A2 =  +  + X>
Y Y > 0: (27)
The approximated solution of equation (24) using a rst-order asymptotic expansion in (,,x0)
around the origin is given by equation (25) where





h()(z;Y ) = A 1
1 
h(x0)(z;Y ) = A 1
2 z (29)
and the M()'s are constants depending on the fundamental parameters of the model.
Proof See Appendix A.2. 
For the following we shall assume that conditions (23) and (27) are satised.
17Appendix A.2 shows that equation (24) contains the hyper-power term 

1  . A standard Taylor expansion
around  = 0 is undened, because the rst derivative of the hyper-power term has a singularity at the origin. To
circumvent this inconvenience we dene  such that e
 = 

1  and expand the term around  = 0. We treat  as a
dierent parameter for the expansion, however, we only requiere  and x0 to be small, because lim!0  = 0.
18Technically speaking, taking advantage of the homogeneity of the problem is not necessary to get the approximated
solution. It was useful, though, to understand that the solution in Proposition 2 was a function of K
 1X.
133.2 Characterizing the Optimal Controls
Now that we have an approximation for the value function J(t) we are ready to revisit the optimal
controls from Proposition 1. We present approximated solutions that converge to Merton's solutions
in the limit.
We need a measure of the total wealth of the country to better contrast our results with those
from Merton's model. Indeed, in Merton's model the agent consumes a constant fraction of its
wealth, so a fair comparison is to analyze the consumption-wealth ratio in our country. Here, the
developing country's wealth is composed by it's capital and the present value of future natural
exports. We use utility indierence pricing to obtain the value an extra unit of natural exports in





Note that the price E(t) already considers the present value of future increments in the natural
exports due to the extra unit today.19 Let us dene the total wealth of the country as
W(t)  K(t) + E(t)X(t) (31)
The denition of W(t) is correct as long as the marginal price of the natural exports E(t) corre-
sponds to the average price. This is valid if E(t) is independent from X(t), which is true at least
to a rst-order degree, because
W(t)
K(t)
= 1 + A 1
2 x(t) + O(2nd-order terms) (32)
implying that E(t)  A 1
2 .20
The next proposition shows the asymptotically equivalent expansions for the consumption-
wealth ratio and the market value of the hedging positions to capital ratio.
PROPOSITION 3: Let us dene c as the consumption-wealth ratio (i.e. c  W 1C), and
 as the ratio of the dollar amount invested in the futures contracts to the capital stock (i.e.
  IFK 1p).
Asymptotically equivalent expressions for optimal consumption and hedging strategies in the



















+ O(2nd-order terms) (33)
19The geometric Brownian motion specication for the natural exports in equation (2) means that changes in the




2 acts as a discount factor for the perpetual ow of natural exports, which is why we restrict A2 to



















Y + O(2nd-order terms)

: (34)
Proof See Appendix A.3. 
The analysis that follows is based on the approximated solutions from this proposition, therefore,
the results are valid only to a rst order degree.
3.2.1 Consumption Strategy
Equation (33) shows that the consumption-wealth ratio is independent from X(t), which means
that the main eect of the natural exports in consumption is through the wealth of the country. A
positive shock to the exports increases the total wealth, and consumption increases proportionally
to the wealth.
Crude oil impacts consumption because it is an input to the production technology. The eect
of crude oil shocks Y (t) in consumption depends on the risk aversion parameter . This is related
to the standard income and substitution eects with respect to each one the crude oil factors. For
the analysis it is convenient to separate the crude oil price from the other factors, because the oil
price is observable and directly aects the productivity of capital. The partial derivative of the









A1 +  u
> 0 (35)
The crude oil price has two opposite eects in today's consumption-wealth ratio. The income
eect in consumption is negative, because an increase in today's crude oil price has a negative
impact in the capital accumulation process of the economy. On the other hand, the substitution
eect in today's consumption is positive. The intuition is that the negative impact of crude oil
in the economy decreases the expected capital stock even further because there is less capital to
invest in every period. This shortage of expected capital increases the relative price of tomorrow's
consumption, thus aecting today's consumption positively. Equation (35) shows that if  > 1,
the consumption-wealth ratio decreases with an increase in the crude oil price. Indeed, if the
country is too worried about consumption smoothing (high ), it will consume less, even if today's
consumption becomes relatively cheaper. In this case, the negative income eect dominates the
21For the moment we assume that  u  0. CCD shows in a three-factor model that for crude oil prices this
parameter is positive and highly signicant. We obtain the same result in the next section for a one-factor model.
15substitution eect. If  < 1, the consumption-wealth ratio increases with crude oil shocks. The
country is less concerned about the variability of consumption and takes advantage of the relatively
lower price of today's consumption. Here, the positive substitution eect dominates the income
eect. Both eects cancel out if risk aversion is unity which corresponds to the logarithmic utility
case. In this case, the consumption-wealth ratio is constant.
The mean-reverting parameter  u in (35) relates the spot price and the convenience yield, but
also determines the persistence of the crude oil price shocks and the unconditional volatility of
crude oil returns. The price shocks have a half-life of   1
u log(2). For values of  u close to zero, the
shocks are permanent and the impact in the economy is higher. An increase in the oil price persists
for a long time in the economy and it aects the productivity of capital in every subsequent period
of time. For high values of  u, the price shocks are temporal, thus they only aect the short-term
dynamics of crude oil prices. In this case, the eect in consumption is less important.
The general impact of the convenience yield factors v(t) in consumption is less intuitive. The
reason is that in the maximal model these factors not only aect the current convenience yield
through  v, but also their own dynamics (see equations (5) and (6)). For example, a positive shock
to vj(t) modies the expected change of the variables fv1(t);:::;vj(t)g, because v is an upper
triangular matrix. The overall eect of this shock in the expected crude oil price depends on  v
and on the elements of column j of v. Fortunately, there is one simple case to analyze. Shocks to
v1(t) aect the convenience yield and its own dynamics while leaving the other v's unaltered. The











u < 0 (36)
Here,  v1 is the eect of v1(t) in the convenience yield and v11 is the (1,1) element of v. v11
determines the persistence of the shocks to v1(t). The derivative c
v1 has the opposite sign than c
u in
equation (35). The reason is simple. A positive shock to v1(t) decreases the expected crude oil spot
price, because the convenience yield has a negative eect in crude oil returns. It turn out also that
the income eect of this variable is positive while its substitution eect is negative. These eects
are the antithesis to the income and substitution eects with respect to price shocks. For  > 1
the consumption-wealth ratio increases because an increase in the convenience yield has a negative
eect on prices, thus an overall positive eect in the economy (income eect). If  < 1 today's
consumption decreases, because it becomes relatively more expensive with respect to tomorrow's
consumption (substitution eect).
22Without loss of generality, we assume that  v1 > 0. Again, we use the results of CCD to consider that v11 > 0.
163.2.2 Hedging Strategy
For the hedging strategy we use the dollar amount invested in the futures contracts to the capital
stock, , instead of the number of contracts. This measure is better for the analysis because
it controls for the size of the country. The hedging strategy in (34) has exactly the same three
components as p in Proposition 1. The myopic demand is positive as long as the Sharpe ratio is
positive. As expected, it is decreasing in the degree of risk-aversion , which implies that more
risk-averse countries seek less exposure to the crude oil risk factors. Also, the myopic demand is
proportional to the total wealth of the country.23 The natural exports increases the total wealth
and allows the country to increase its investment in futures contracts. The second term of the
hedging strategy is the statistical hedging demand. This demand is negative for those crude oil
factors that have a positive correlation with the natural exports and viceversa. Indeed, a higher
correlation of the exports with a particular factor, means that a portfolio of futures that is perfectly
correlated with this factor works better as a hedge against shocks in the exports. This implies that
fewer units of this portfolio are necessary for the hedge.
The third term in equation (34) has the productive hedging demands. It is not surprising that
these demands have a similar structure than the sensitivity of consumption with respect to the
crude oil shocks (i.e. c
u and c
v1). These demands are proportional to M()
Y , because the country
hedges against those crude oil shocks that impact consumption. Crude oil shocks are transferred
to consumption through the productivity of capital. Again the sign depends on the risk-aversion
of the country. Consider a portfolio of futures contracts, fu, that is perfectly correlated with the
shocks to the crude oil (log) price, u(t). An increase in the crude oil price, has a negative eect
on today's consumption if  > 1 and a positive eect if  < 1 (see equation (35)). Clearly, the
country chooses a strategy that minimizes the eect of these shocks in consumption by taking a
long position in fu if  > 1 or a short position in fu if  < 1. The eects on consumption are
compensated by the payo from the marking-to-market of fu. If these shocks are persistent (low
 u, high M()
u ), the country is more worried about this type of uncertainty and takes a larger
position in fu. The converse occurs with the convenience yield shocks through the factor v1(t). An
increase in the convenience yield has a positive eect on the capital accumulation process, because
decreases expected oil prices. It has a positive eect on today's consumption if  > 1 and a negative
eect if  < 1 (see equation (36)). If  > 1, the country chooses a short position in a portfolio of
futures fv1, that is perfectly correlated with v1(t). If  < 1, the country takes a long position in
this portfolio.
In the next section we take our model to the data. We study the decision of a developing
country assuming that crude oil prices are driven by a one-factor Gaussian model. This simple
framework will help us quantify the aggregate eect of the crude oil shocks and the natural exports
on the country's decisions.
23Recall that the rst-order approximation to the total wealth to capital ratio is 1 + A
 1
2 x.
174 Empirical Results for a One-Factor Model
In this section we estimate a one-factor model for crude oil prices and analyze the consumption
and hedging strategies of the developing country. One futures contract is enough to span the whole
futures curve in a one-factor model. In this model it is also easier to connect the empirical results
with the theoretical results discussed in the previous section. Despite its simplicity, the model has
a time-varying convenience yield and is able to generate both, contango and backwardation, in the
futures curves. The relation between the spot price and the convenience yield,  u, also regulates
the persistence of the crude oil shocks.
We rst estimate the crude oil pricing model and calibrate the parameters for the country tech-
nologies and utility functions. Then we discuss the eect of the natural exports and its correlation
with crude oil prices in consumption and the hedging strategy. Finally, we look at the particular
eect of risk-aversion of the country and mean-reversion and volatility of crude oil prices in the
optimal controls.
4.1 Crude Oil Estimates and Developing Country Parameters
We estimate a single factor model for the crude oil spot (log) price u(t). The model is equivalent to
the one in equations (4) and (5) with the extra restrictions that & =  v = 0. Under the historical
measure, the dynamics of the futures price on a contract that matures 1 periods from now is:
dF1 = F1Bu;1uudt + F1Bu;1udZu (37)
with Bu;1 = e  u 1. The convenience yield parameter  u aects the volatility of the futures returns,
and therefore, the futures risk premia.
The dataset consist on weekly crude oil futures prices from 1/2/1990 to 12/31/2005 from
NYMEX with maturities of 1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 24, 30 and 36 months. We use maximum-
likelihood estimation using both time-series and cross-sectional data. As in Chen and Scott (1993)
and Pearson and Sun (1994), we assume that some of the data is observed with no error. In par-
ticular, we follow Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Jones (2008) and CCD and choose to perfectly
t the rst principal component of the futures curve. Since the principal component remains ane
in the state variable, it can easily be inverted to obtain the state variable u(t). The remaining
principal components of futures prices are then over-identied and observed with \measurement
errors," which we assume follow AR(1) processes with the same autocorrelation degree.
Table 1 presents four groups of maximum-likelihood estimates for the single factor model.
We set the interest rate to r = 0:03 without loosing any generality, because we estimate the
convenience yield parameter  0 (see footnote 8). The rst group (Set 0) has the unconstrained
parameter estimates. We obtain interesting results that are consistent with the ndings of CCD.
18First, we detect that the convenience yield parameters and the volatility of crude oil returns are all
signicantly dierent from zero. Moreover, the mean-reverting parameter that plays a particular
role in the consumption and hedging strategies, is positive and highly signicant ( u = 0:076). We
also nd that the risk premium parameter u is not signicant. Interestingly, CCD found that even
for a richer structure, the crude oil risk-premia parameters are less signicant than those for copper,
silver and gold. The most important eect of u is the existence of the myopic demand, a result
that is well-known and broadly documented in the portfolio selection literature. Therefore, we
decide to drop this parameter. The second group of parameters (Set 1) has the estimates assuming
that u = 0. We nd that the other estimates are not aected by this assumption and that the
change in the log-likelihood is not signicant.24 We use this parameter set for the analysis of the
strategies below. The third and forth parameter groups in Table 1 (Sets 2 & 3) have the estimates
assuming a particular value for the mean-reversion parameter  u. To analyze the eect of the
parameter  u, it is important to consider a realistic pricing model, thus the other parameters need
to adjust to changes in  u. For example, note that the parameter  0 changes radically for the
dierent assumptions for  u. This occurs, because the parameters  0 and  u jointly regulate the
slope of the futures curve. It doesn't make sense to change  u while keeping  0 constant.
We choose Chile as the benchmark developing country, because it's economy has similar char-
acteristics to the ones considered for our representative country. Chile's exports are mostly from
the mining industry and it's the world's largest copper producer. According to the U.S. Geological
Survey, Chile accounted for 35% of the world's copper production in 2006 followed by the U.S.
with 8% of the global production (see USGS 2008). Chile has also more than 31% of the world's
known copper reserves. In the last decades, Chile has had a stable economy absent from major
governability problems, which are sometimes common in emerging economies. This means that its
economic data is more related to the productivity parameters in our model, than to other political
factors that are not considered in this study.
Table 2 shows the parameters that we use for the benchmark developing economy. We rst
calibrate the marginal productivity of capital (MPR) which in our case is (1 ). We follow Caselli
and Feyrer (2007) and use 9% for Chile. This paper estimates the MPR for various countries using
a measure that accounts for natural capital adjustments and dierences in prices of capital and
consumption goods. Natural capital adjustments result in that the natural capital accounts, such
as land and natural resources, are deducted from the national wealth, because only the payments
to reproducible capital are relevant to estimate the MPR. For the oil share of income in Chile,
, we use 3%. Recent studies such as Finn (2000) and Wei (2003) use an energy share of 4%,
but oil consumption accounts only for fraction of the total energy consumption of the country.
Considering the MPR and the oil share of income, we calibrate a total factor productivity, , of
9%
1 3% = 9:3%. We normalize ! to 1 for the eciency of oil parameter in Chile. The International
Energy Agency (2004) report documents that on average, oil-importing developing countries use
more than twice of the oil than OECD countries to produce a unit of economic output. This means
24The chi-squared statistic with one degree of freedom for the LR test is 2.8, while the critical value for a 5%
signicance level is 3.84 (i.e. Probf
2
1  3:84g = 0:05).
19that we should consider a higher eciency parameter, say ! = 2, if we want to consider a more
developed country than Chile.
For the initial natural exports to capital ratio, x0, we need an estimate of X(0) and K(0). The
total copper exports for Chile were X(0) = US$ 14.9 billions in 2005. For the initial capital stock,
we nd K(0) such that the output in equation (1) is the Chilean GDP in 2005. The output of
the country considers the optimal demand of oil from Proposition 1 and needs an estimate for the
crude oil price. Using that the GDP was US$ 118.9 billions in 2005 and that the average crude
oil WTI price that year was US$ 56.5 per barrel, we obtain an estimate for the Chilean capital
stock of US$ 2015.5 billions. These estimates yield an initial natural exports to capital ratio of
x0 = 0:7%. Interestingly, these gures imply that the optimal imports of crude oil, S(0)Q(0), is
US$ 4.1 billions which is very close to the Chilean fuel and energy imports of US$ 3.6 billions in
2005. To estimate the volatility of the natural exports returns, X, and it's correlation with the
crude oil shocks, u, we assume that the Chilean copper production changes at a constant rate.
This implies that the second moments are due only to variations in copper prices. We consider the
closest maturity futures price to be a proxy for the spot price for both, copper and crude oil. Using
monthly data from 1995 to 2007, we nd that the annualized volatility of copper returns is 21.2%
and the correlation between copper and crude oil shocks is 28.9%. The selection of the export's
depreciation rate, , is the most arbitrary one. We choose 5% as the annual depreciation rate,
but try dierent values later. A positive rate captures that the natural resource is exhaustible and
that the developing country diversies its exports over time. Finally, we assume that the country's
risk-aversion parameter, , is 5.0, and that its impatience parameters, , is 5%. These values are
standard in the literature, but given that the country's risk-aversion has a great repercussion in
consumption and in the productive hedging demands, we do a sensitivity analysis with respect to
it.
4.2 Consumption Strategy
One of the main objectives of the paper is to study the eect of crude oil in the country's consump-
tion decision. For this reason we concentrate on the parameters related to the economy and to the
oil dynamics, and their eect on the consumption-wealth ratio in equation (33). It is important
to remember that the relative size of the natural exports, x0, has a direct eect on consumption
through an increase in wealth, but it has no rst-order eect on the consumption-wealth ratio.
Figure 1 present the consumption strategy with respect to the technology parameters that
determine the impact of the oil in the economy. The gure has three plots, each one for a dierent
country's risk-aversion parameter. Each plot shows the consumption-wealth ratio, c, as a function
of the oil share of input, , for four dierent situations: one is the Merton case (i.e.  = x0 = 0)
and the others represent countries with dierent eciency of oil usage, !. The plots conrm
that risk aversion has a decisive eect on consumption. For  < 1, the oil share of input has
a positive eect on today's consumption (upper plot), while for  > 1 this eect is negative
20(lower plot). The intuition is that for our parameters,  has a negative eect on the productivity
of capital.25 Therefore,  has a negative income eect and a positive substitution eect. As
always, the substitution eect dominates for  < 1 and the income eect prevails if  > 1. The
opposite happens with respect to the eciency parameter !, because for higher ! less barrels of
oil are demanded for production.26 The empirical evidence supports the fact that more developed
economies are more ecient in the usage of oil than less developed countries. This means that if
 < 1, a developed country consumes a lower fraction of its wealth than a developing economy
(upper plot for a xed ). The reverse occurs if  > 1 (lower plot for a xed ). Also, there's
an overall eect of risk aversion in the level of c that can be observed by comparing the Merton
cases across plots. Today's consumption is increasing on risk-aversion for the Merton case. This
occurs because we have calibrated a total factor productivity, , that is higher than the impatience
parameter, . A relatively high  implies a positive income eect and a negative substitution eect
of this parameter, so the consumption-wealth ratio is higher for  > 1. Of course, all income and
substitution eects cancel out if  = 1, implying that no variable changes the consumption-wealth
ratio that is xed at  = 5% (middle plot).
The eect of the crude oil price and its dynamics is shown in Figure 2. We consider again
dierent risk-aversion. Each plot shows the consumption-wealth ratio, c, as a function of the
crude oil price, S, for 3 dierent sets of parameters. As we mentioned before, each set has a
dierent assumption for the mean-reversion parameter  u. The plots conrm that crude oil prices
have an eect on consumption that depends on risk-aversion and on the persistence of the shocks.
Crude oil is an input to the production technology, therefore it has a negative income eect and
a positive substitution eect. As before, this means that for  < 1 today's consumption-wealth
ratio increases (upper plot), and for  > 1, consumption decreases (lower plot). Higher degrees of
mean-reversion (i.e. lower persistence) tend to decrease these eects because shocks are short lived
and the price reverts faster to its long term mean. Finally, for a country with log utility, the net
eect of these variables disappear.
4.3 Hedging Strategy
To study the hedging strategy we use the ratio between the dollar amount invested in the futures
contracts and the capital stock from equation (34). Because oil has only one risk factor, we consider
that at every point in time the country takes positions in one futures contract. We assume that
this contract expires 3 months from now and its position is rebalanced continuously.
Figure 3 shows the dierent sources of the hedging strategy as a function of the correlation
between the crude oil and the natural exports shocks, u. The gure has three plots, each one
25We can show from equation (21) that the productivity of capital is decreasing in , i.e.
@
@ < 0, if the input ratio
! Q
K is less than 1. For our parameters this condition is violated only for extremely low crude oil prices (S < 0:00279).
26Again, from equation (21) we get that
@
@! > 0. The income eect w.r.t ! is positive while its substitution eect
is negative.
21for a dierent relative size of the exports, x0. The myopic demand is represented by 1 which
is always zero, because the parameter Set 1 assumes that the oil price risk premium, u, is zero.
The productive hedging demand, 
3, is independent of the exports and the correlation u. This
demand is positive in all plots (
3 = 1:4%), because the risk-aversion degree for the country is
greater than 1. This value implies that the country takes long positions in the futures contracts.
The interesting term here is the pure hedging or statistical hedging component, 
2. As we noticed
before, 
2 is decreasing in the correlation u and proportional to the relative size of the exports, x0.
In particular, this demand is more negative for positive correlations and high exports, implying a
larger short position in the futures contracts (see the lower plot for higher correlations). Figure 3 is
also useful to understand up to what extent the natural exports can be used to hedge the crude oil
risk. For example, consider the case of Chile which corresponds the plot in the middle (x0 = 0:7%).
We have calibrated a value of 28.9% for u, which means that the net hedging position, , is
almost zero. The short positions due to this positive correlation oset the long positions in the
contract from the productive hedging demand. Therefore, for this case, the exports are indeed a
natural hedge against crude oil shocks.
Figure 4 shows the hedging strategy as a function of the oil share of input, , for dierent
parameter sets (Sets 1, 2 & 3 from Table 1). This gure is good to analyze the productive hedging
demands, because this is the only demand that varies with .27 Each one of the three plots in
the gure is for a dierent risk-aversion degree. The upper plot shows that the hedging strategy
is decreasing in  if  < 1. In this case, the productive hedging demand is negative. If  < 1 a
negative shock to crude oil prices decreases today's consumption (see gure 2). This is specially
true if oil is more important for the economy (higher 's). This higher sensitivity forces the country
to take a larger short position in the futures contract. The reverse happens for  > 1 (lower plot).
In both cases, the eect of  decreases for a higher mean-reversion degree, i.e. the slope of the
curves becomes atter. This occurs because the eect of the crude oil shock is less persistent, so
fewer contracts are needed to hedge against this scenario. Finally, for the log case (middle plot), the
productive hedging demand is zero and the hedging strategy is independent from . In this case,
the demands are dierent for each parameter set, because the oil returns volatilities and mean-
reversion estimates changes. The statistical hedging demand is decreasing in u and increasing in
 u through the volatility of the futures returns. For the middle plot the volatility eect dominates
implying that the set with a higher volatility has a lower hedging strategy.
In order to quantify if the size of the futures demands are signicant or not, we express the
strategy in terms of the imports of oil, S Q. We dene  as the dollar amount in the futures
contracts over the dollar amount of the crude oil imports, i.e.   IF(S Q) 1p. For the one-
factor model, the interpretation of this variable is simple. This hedge ratio represents the portion of
the oil imports being hedged. Figure 5 shows the hedge ratio against the correlation u for dierent
levels of relative natural exports, x0. We have already presented the eect of these variables in
the hedging strategy, so here we limit the discussion to the measurement of the hedge ratio. Let's
27Recall from equation (34) that the productive hedging demands are proportional to .
22consider the case when the natural exports are high (x0 = 1:4%). When the correlation between
oil and exports shocks is high (u  0:5), the hedging decision is to take a short position in the
futures contract for approximately 30% of the imports of crude oil. If the correlation is zero, the
optimal strategy is to hedge around 10% of the total oil imports. If the correlation is negative and
large (u   0:5), the hedge ratio can be as large as 55% of the oil imports.
Finally, gure 6 shows the hedging strategy with respect to the depreciation rate of the exports,
. We do a sensitivity analysis with respect to this rate, because it was one of the few parameters
that was arbitrarily chosen for the calibration. Of course, this parameter is only relevant for the
case where x0 > 0. The hedge ratio increases with , because the negative statistical hedging
component decreases in absolute terms with this parameter.28 This occurs because for a higher ,
the present value of the exports (A 1
2 X(t)) is lower, thus it decreases its weight in the economy.
5 Conclusions
We study the dynamic consumption and hedging strategies of an oil-importing developing country
that confronts exogenous crude oil shocks. These countries dier from more developed economies in
that their technologies are more intense and less ecient in the use of energy. Also, their economies
typically rely on the export of a small number of primary commodities that can potentially be
correlated with the crude oil shocks.
The developing country optimally chooses consumption, the physical crude oil imports and the
hedging strategy for the existing crude oil futures contracts. Less ecient countries with high
degrees of risk aversion consume less than more developed countries, because ineciencies generate
a negative income eect. For countries that care less about consumption-smoothing the opposite
may occur, because there exists a substitution eect that makes today's consumption relatively
cheaper than tomorrow's consumption. The crude oil price has an overall negative eect for oil-
importing economies, because of a lower productivity of capital. The income and substitution
eects balance the eect of the crude oil in the economy. Countries with relative risk-aversion
degrees greater than one, decrease their consumption if a positive price shock occurs. Shocks to
other crude oil factors, such as the convenience yield, are also studied. The impact of these shocks
on consumption is through their eect in the expected crude oil price. The more persistent these
shocks are, the greater are their impact in the economy.
The long/short positions in the futures contracts are used for hedging purposes, but they also
enhance the country's investment opportunity set. The demand for these contracts can be decom-
posed into the standard myopic demand, a pure hedging or statistical hedging component and the
productive hedging demands. The relative size of the natural exports and their correlation with
the crude oil shocks are essential for the pure hedging component. This hedging term helps us
28The statistical hedging demand is negative, because we consider a positive u for the benchmark case.
23understand up to what extent the natural exports can be used to hedge the crude oil risk. We nd
productive hedging demands with respect to each crude oil factor. These demands hedge against
future changes in the productivity of capital rather than against changes in the investment oppor-
tunity set as in Breeden (1979). The country's risk-aversion degree, the eect of each oil risk factor
in consumption and the shocks persistence drive the size and direction of these demands. Finally,
we choose Chile as a benchmark economy and estimate a one-factor model for crude oil prices. We
nd that the country's copper exports act as a signicant natural hedge against oil shocks.
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28Appendix
A Proofs of Propositions
This appendix contains the proofs of Propositions 1 to 3.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 shows the optimal consumption, demand for oil and hedging strategies for the developing
country. The optimal strategies are obtained from the standard rst order conditions of the HJB equation
in (18) with respect to each of the controls C, Q and p.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 presents a closed-form approximation of the value function of the problem that faces the
developing country. To obtain this result, we replace equation (22) and the optimal controls fC;Q;pg
from Proposition 1 in equation (18) to get the following non-linear second-order PDE
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As far as we know, there is no closed-form solution for this equation. However, a solution exists for the case
where  = 0 with > = (;;x0). In this case, the problem converges to the standard Merton problem and
h(z;Y ;0) = 0. Therefore, we pursue an asymptotic expansion around this solution to obtain an approximated
closed-form expression for h(z;Y ). First, we assume that h(z;Y ) is linear on  (see equation (25)). We
replace this guess in equation (A1) and do a Taylor expansion of G(z;Y ;) around  = 0. Considering only
the rst-order terms we get
0 = G(z;Y ;0) + >rG(z;Y ;0) (A2)
where rG() is the gradient vector of G() with respect to . We need to nd the functions h()(z;Y ),
h()(z;Y ) and h(x0)(z;Y ) such that equation (A2) is satised. The existence of a solution when  = 0
implies that G(z;Y ;0) = 0. Also, since (A2) is valid for any (small) ,  and x0, the problem reduces to
nding the h(j)(z;Y ) such that
rG(z;Y ;0) = 0 (A3)
We guess an ane structure for the h(j)(z;Y ) functions,
h()(z;Y ) = M()
0   M()




h()(z;Y ) = M()
0   M()




h(x0)(z;Y ) = M(x0)
0   M(x0)




29After replacing these equations in the expansion (A2) we obtain that,
rG(z;Y ;0) =  
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, L> = (1   log(!); 1;0), >
1 = (1;0;0), >
3 = (0;0;1), I11 = 1>
1 and In is the
identity matrix with rank n. Since equation (A3) has to be valid for any z and Y , the following equations
must hold:
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To obtain the results in Proposition 2 we replace the M0s from equation (A14) in our original guess (A4)-(A6).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 presents approximated closed-form expressions for the optimal strategies of the developing
country. First, we dene the consumption-wealth ratio as
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and the ratio of the dollar amount invested in the futures contracts to the capital stock as
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(A20)
If we use Proposition 2 and replace equations (22) and (25) in the optimal controls in (A17) and (A20), we
obtain complex expressions that are dicult to interpret. These approximated expressions are non-linear on
,  and x0, however, we can obtain more tractable solutions at no cost. Following Kogan and Uppal (2003),
we present the approximations in a asymptotically equivalent representation by applying a new Taylor
expansion to the approximated optimal controls. Note that we do not need any extra assumption, because
we are already considering that  and x0 are small. The new expansions are asymptotically equivalent to
the original ones in the sense that both converge to Merton's solutions in the limit.
31Table 1: Maximum-Likelihood Estimates for the One-Factor Crude Oil Pricing Model
Maximum-likelihood estimates for the one-factor model for crude oil weekly prices from 1990 to 2005. Sets 1, 2 and 3
restrict the risk-premium parameter to zero, i.e., u = 0. Sets 2 and 3 x the crude-oil mean-reversion degree to 0
and 1, respectively.
Set 0 Set 1 Set 2 Set 3
Crude Oil Crude Oil Crude Oil Crude Oil
Parameter Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
r 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030
 0 -0.207 -0.207 0.031 -2.963
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006)
 u 0.076 0.076 0.000 1.000
(0.001) (0.000)
u 1.674 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.973)
u 0.247 0.248 0.245 0.427
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
error auto-corr. 0.809 0.809 0.840 0.883
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Log-likelihood 26017.3 26015.9 25613.2 24980.8
Table 2: Developing Country Parameters



























































































































Figure 1: Consumption-wealth ratio and technology parameters related to the crude oil. Consumption-
wealth ratio, c
, as a function of the oil share of input, , the eciency of oil usage, !, and the country's risk aversion,
. The top gure is for  = 0:75, the plot in the middle is for  = 1 and the one below is for  = 5. The Merton
model lines correspond to the case where  = x0 = 0%. For the crude oil dynamics we use the parameters from Set
1 in Table 1 and for the country's technologies we use the parameters from Table 2.





















































































































Figure 2: Consumption-wealth ratio and crude oil prices. Consumption-wealth ratio, c
, as a function of
the crude oil price, S, dierent sets of crude oil parameters and the country's risk aversion, . The top gure is for
 = 0:75, the plot in the middle is for  = 1 and the one below is for  = 5. Set 1 has the default crude oil parameters.
To obtain Sets 2 and 3, we x the mean reversion degree in  u = 0 and  u = 1, respectively, and estimate the other
parameters. For the country's technologies we use the parameters from Table 2.












































































































Figure 3: Hedging strategy, correlation and exports. Sources of the hedging strategy, 
, as a function of
the correlation between crude oil and natural exports shocks, u, and the relative size of the natural exports, x0. 1
is the myopic demand, 2 is the statistical hedging component and 3 is the productive hedging demand. The top
gure is for x0 = 0:0%, the plot in the middle is for x0 = 0:7% and the one below is for x0 = 1:4%. For the crude
oil dynamics we use the parameters from Set 1 in Table 1 and for the country's technologies we use the parameters
from Table 2.























































































Figure 4: Hedging strategy and crude oil. Hedging strategy, 
, as a function of the oil share of input, ,
dierent sets of crude oil parameters and the country's risk aversion, . The top gure is for  = 0:75, the plot in
the middle is for  = 1 and the one below is for  = 5. Set 1 has the default crude oil parameters. To obtain Sets 2
and 3, we x the mean reversion degree in  u = 0 and  u = 1, respectively, and estimate the other parameters. For
the country's technologies we use the parameters from Table 2.


























Figure 5: Hedge ratio, correlation and exports. Total fraction of crude oil imports being hedged, 
, as
a function of the correlation between crude oil and natural exports shocks, u, and the relative size of the natural
exports, x0. For the crude oil dynamics we use the parameters from Set 1 in Table 1 and for the country's technologies
we use the parameters from Table 2.
























Figure 6: Hedge ratio and depreciation. Total fraction of crude oil imports being hedged, 
, as a function of
the exports depreciation rate, , and the relative size of the natural exports, x0. For the crude oil dynamics we use
the parameters from Set 1 in Table 1 and for the country's technologies we use the parameters from Table 2.
37